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REGION CODES AND HUMAN RIGHTS*
MOLLY LAND*
Professor Yu's article on DVD region coding, Region Codes and
the Territorial Mess, is a thoughtful and important contribution to the
ongoing discussion about human rights and access to knowledge. His
discussion of region codes and human rights not only allows us to see
the way in which technological measures can have consequences for the
basic rights of individuals but also challenges us to define the
appropriate role for human rights law in responding to those
consequences. It is precisely the kind of activity that Professor Yu
points to-the decisions of corporate actors pursuing their own interests
that have significant unanticipated effects on individual rights-that is a
recurring and thorny problem for those concerned about expression and
culture today. In this essay, I examine Professor Yu's arguments that
region codes burden human rights and consider what the issue of region
coding illustrates about some of the challenges associated with using
human rights law to respond to limitations on access to knowledge.
Professor Yu makes a convincing case that region codes can
violate the right to participate in cultural life. Article 15(l)(a) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) protects the right "to take part in cultural life."' As Professor
Yu explains, "the enjoyment and the exercise of cultural rights depend
largely on the existence of cultural materials." 2 Interpreting Article
15(l)(a), the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee (ESCR
Committee)-the U.N. body charged with receiving state reports on
their compliance with the ICESCR-has stated in General Comment
No. 21, "States parties should not prevent migrants from maintaining
* Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article, in whole or in
part, for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom
use, subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this
copyright notice and grant of permission be included on all copies.
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. C 2012 Molly Land.
I International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15(1)(a), opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR];
see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27(1), G.A. Res. 217 (Ill) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life
of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.").
2 Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 187, 226
(2012).
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their cultural links with their countries of origin."3 Immigrant families
may need access to DVDs from their home countries to help teach their
children their native language and culture.4 Relying on this general
comment, Professor Yu argues that "DVD region codes threaten to take
away an individual's 'cultural choice,'"s and when that happens, states
may have the obligation to regulate the private sector to ensure such
violations do not occur. 6
Professor Yu also considers the impact of DVD region coding on
the right to freedom of expression. Expressive rights are protected in
Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which provides: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally,
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice."7 He argues that DVD region coding makes it more costly
for individuals in repressive countries to obtain uncensored versions of
material that may be otherwise available only in censored forms, and
thus affects their ability to route around state censorship.' In this way,
DVD region codes compound the effect of the underlying violation of
the right to expression represented by state censorship.
Indeed, there is a good case to be made that region coding not only
compounds censorship but also itself burdens expressive rights. Article
19(2) of the ICCPR protects much more than the ability to express
oneself and hold an opinion-it also protects the ability to "seek" and
"receive" information. 9 Although Article 19(2) is in great need of
further theoretical development in this respect, its protection of both the
active and passive dimensions of expressive behavior as well as the
ability to search for information have important implications for a
variety of current debates over regulation of the Internet, including net
neutrality and the obligations of Internet service providers. In the
context of region coding, the inability to access lawfully purchased
material that is not coded to play in one's home jurisdiction is a direct
burden on the "expression and receipt of communications of every form
of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others."10 Moreover,
3 United Nations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 21: Right of
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15, Para. I (a), of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 1 34, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 21].
4 See Yu, supra note 2, at 226-27.
5 Id at 228-29 (quoting General Comment No. 21, supra note 3, 7).
6 Id at 229.
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(2), opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
8 See Yu, supra note 2, at 231.
9 ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 19(2).
1o United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of
Opinion and Expression, T 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter General
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Article 19(2) explicitly protects this right "regardless of frontiers."'I
Although "regardless of frontiers" certainly applies to prevent
censorship of expressive material based on its country of origin, it also
means we should be able to receive or enjoy such content regardless of
where we purchase it or where we ultimately choose to live.
Similarly, DVD region coding not only impedes the ability of
immigrant families to exercise meaningful cultural choices but also
burdens the individual right to participate in culture more broadly. The
ESCR Committee has explicitly stated that one of the "core obligations"
of the right to participate in culture is the obligation "[t]o eliminate any
barriers or obstacles that inhibit or restrict a person's access to the
person's own culture or to other cultures, without discrimination and
without consideration for frontiers of any kind."' 2 As interpreted by the
Committee, culture refers to the sum total of things "through which
individuals, groups of individuals and communities express their
humanity and the meaning they give to their existence, and build their
world view representing their encounter with the external forces
affecting their lives."' 3 Limiting our ability to engage with cultural
materials originating from other regions constitutes a barrier based
solely on geography that inhibits our ability to express our humanity
and create our world view. As Professor Yu suggests, even
"uncontroversial, highly commercial, and seemingly frivolous
[entertainment products] may contain useful political information,
feature the American way of life, and therefore suggest the possibility
of a different, if not better, life."14
But do these arguments go too far? After all, they are only region
codes. At what point do the ordinary burdens on access associated with
corporate commercial conduct rise to the level of a human rights
violation? Region coding provides an excellent opportunity for
considering the role of human rights in ensuring access to knowledge
because it raises two central conceptual difficulties inherent in defining
rights of access: How much access is required? And at what point does
non-state activity trigger state responsibility? Given the pervasive
nature of private regulation in the area of access to information and
knowledge today, finding answers to these questions has never been
more important.
Comment No. 34].
1I ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 19(2).
12 General Comment No. 21, supra note 3, T 55(d).
13 Id. T 13.
14 Yu, supra note 2, at 232. One could also consider region codes as implicating the right to
property, which is protected in regional instruments such as the European Convention on Human
Rights, and the freedom to leave a country, which is protected in the ICCPR. See Protocol to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1,
Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 155; ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 12(1).
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First, how much access is required? Certainly, if there were no
way for a particular family to access programming in its native
language-if there were a complete bar-this would violate the cultural
and expressive rights of the individuals in that family. Anything short
of a complete bar, however, presents a problem of line drawing. Access
in the context of information and knowledge does not carry with it
internal definitions that naturally follow from the right. We might know
how much food or water one needs, but not how much culture or
expression. In addition, it can be difficult to articulate restrictions on
access to knowledge as a human rights violation because cultural goods
are in some sense fungible; the need for access to one particular cultural
good could in at least some instances be satisfied by access to another.' 5
The answer to the question of how much access is required, in
some ways follows directly from the definition of the right itself.
According to the ESCR Committee, the right to take part in cultural life
has three components: "(a) [p]articipation . .. in . . . . (b) [a]ccess ...
to . . . . [and] (c) [c]ontribution to cultural life . . "16 States are
required to take "positive action" to protect the right to participate in
cultural life, including by "ensuring preconditions for participation,
facilitation and promotion of cultural life, and access to and
preservation of cultural goods."17 Thus, Article 15 requires access to as
much cultural material as necessary to fulfill its purpose-namely, to
ensure that people are able to participate in, access, and contribute to a
cultural life of their choice. Access in this sense is not an end in and of
itself, but a means to an end, and the amount of cultural goods needed
by any one person will differ depending on the person and their
particular needs and situation.
The ESCR Committee's purposive approach to cultural goods is
consistent with its approach to other rights, including rights more easily
quantified than a right to participate in culture. The right to water, for
example, is a right to a water supply that is "sufficient and continuous
for personal . . . use."1 Although "[t]he quantity of water available for
each person should correspond to World Health Organization (WHO)
guidelines,"' 9 the Committee has resisted quantifying the right to water
15 Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 21-22 (2009) (noting, in
the context of cumulative restrictions on the public domain, that "[u]nless the restriction itself is
understood as a violation, or there are no adequate and sufficient substitutes, it will often be
extremely difficult to make a connection between the harm and a particular rights
violation. . . .").
16 General Comment No. 21, supra note 3, 15.
17 Id. 6.
11 United Nations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The
Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), 12(a), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No.
15].
19 Id.; see also World Health Organization [WTO], Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality, at 83
[Vol. 30:275
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so simply: "The adequacy of water should not be interpreted narrowly,
by mere reference to volumetric quantities and technologies. Water
should be treated as a social and cultural good, and not primarily as an
economic good."20 Similarly, in interpreting the right to adequate food,
the ESCR Committee has said that this right "shall ... not be
interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with a
minimum package of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients." 21
Thus, even with respect to more easily quantified rights such as water
and food, the ESCR Committee has emphasized that access should be
measured with respect to each individual's particular physical, social
and cultural needs.
Two other principles flow from the Committee's interpretation of
the right to participate in cultural life. First, access to cultural goods
must be ensured without discrimination.22 As the ESCR Committee
explains, this obligation of non-discrimination means that "no one shall
be excluded from access to cultural practices, goods and services." 23
Thus, to the extent that cultural goods are available, they should be
available to all without discrimination. Second, enough cultural goods
must be available to enable individuals to make meaningful choices
with respect to their cultural identity and development. As the ESCR
Committee explains in General Comment No. 21 and as Professor Yu
emphasizes in his article, participation in cultural life is centrally
defined by individual choice. 24 Everyone should have the ability "to
choose his or her own identity, to identify or not with one or several
communities or to change that choice, to take part in the political life of
society, to engage in one's own cultural practices and to express oneself
in the language of one's choice." 25 Toward these goals, the Committee
recommends that states adopt "policies for the protection and promotion
of cultural diversity, and facilitat[e] access to a rich and diversified
range of cultural expressions." 2 6  In a very deep sense, cultural
expression is not, in fact, fungible-the creativity inherent in expression
is what makes each cultural good distinct and unique and allows these
(4th ed. 2011) ("Based on currently available data, a minimum volume of 7.5 litres per capita per
day will provide sufficient water for hydration and incorporation into food for most people under
most conditions.").
20 General Comment No. 15, supra note 19, 11; see also Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality,
supra note 19, at 3 ("Although the Guidelines describe a quality of water that is acceptable for
lifelong consumption, the establishment of these Guidelines, including guideline values, should
not be regarded as implying that the quality of drinking-water may be degraded to the
recommended level. Indeed, a continuous effort should be made to maintain drinking-water
quality at the highest possible level.").
21 United Nations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The
Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
22 General Comment No. 21, supra note 3, 21.
23 Id. 22.
24 Id. 15; Yu, supra note 2, at 228.
25 General Comment No. 21, supra note 3, 15(a).
26 Id. 52(a).
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goods to play such a crucial role in human development. 27 Thus,
although the right to participate in cultural life may not necessarily
include the right to access any one particular work, it does mean that the
state has to ensure access to a diversity of works sufficient to allow us
to make meaningful choices.
How much access is enough must be analyzed somewhat
differently in the context of freedom of expression. With respect to
cultural rights, the articulated end-the ability to participate in cultural
life-contextualizes the concept of access and provides a natural way to
delimit when burdens on access are cognizable as violations. As part of
the right to freedom of expression, however, the right to seek and
receive information is protected directly as an end in and of itself. This
does not mean the right cannot be limited, however. Like many human
rights, states can impose reasonable limits on expression as long as
these limits satisfy the requirements of human rights law. Under Article
19(3), as interpreted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
limitations on the rights to seek, receive and impart information are
permitted as long as they (a) are provided by law, (b) pursue a
legitimate purpose, namely, the protection of the rights or reputations of
others or of national security, public order, or public health and morals,
and (c) are both necessary and the least restrictive means for achieving
the stated goal. 28
Not every burden on expression triggers the scrutiny of this three-
step test. Certainly when a state regulates expression directly or
indirectly, it must comply with these limitations.29 Burdens imposed by
non-state actors, however, present a different kind of problem. As
Professor Yu discusses, human rights law operates primarily on state
actors. 30 Although the report of Special Representative John Ruggie
represents a significant and important step toward understanding and
articulating the human rights obligations of corporations,31 primary
27 My thanks to Eva Subotnik for this insight.
28 See ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 19(3); see also Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, [ 24, Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue).
29 There may also be a de minimis exception for state activities that impose a de facto burden on
expression. This is not to say that there are de minimis violations, but rather that state activities
that indirectly burden expression might not in every instance rise to the level of a violation that
triggers scrutiny under Article 19(3). A similar principle taking into account both the severity of
the conduct and the public interest in the issue is present in the caselaw of the European Court of
Human Rights. See Xavier-Baptiste Ruedin, De Minimis Non Curat the European Court of
Human Rights: The Introduction of a New Admissibility Criterion (Article 12 of Protocol No.14),
2008 EuR. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 80, 93-99 (2008). As Anita Bernstein has emphasized in the civil
rights context, however, it is important to ensure that efforts to filter in this way do not end up
trivializing violations. See Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De
Minimis Curet Lex, 62 FLA. L. REV. 895 (2010).
30 See Yu, supra note 2, at 229.
31 See generally Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue of Human
280 [Vol. 30:275
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responsibility for human rights protection still rests with states. Yet the
activities of non-state actors are playing an increasingly central role in
regulating access to expression and culture. For example, as Rebecca
MacKinnon documents in her recent book, Apple's choices about which
apps to feature in its store look a lot like censorship. Among other
things, Apple has removed from its app store a cartoon version of James
Joyce's Ulysses, the work of Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist Mark
Fiore, and an app by Exodus International, a Christian group that
regards homosexuality as sinful. 32 The challenge is determining the
point at which those burdens become violations of internationally
guaranteed rights that require state intervention.
Yet in attempting to ascertain when non-state activity will trigger
state responsibility, we may be asking the wrong question. The
question is not when states are obligated to act, but how. Under the
ICCPR, states have an obligation "to respect and to ensure" the rights
protected by that covenant. 33 They are required not only to refrain from
violating rights themselves but also to ensure rights, which includes an
obligation to "adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and
other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal obligations." 34
States are obligated not only to avoid engaging in censorship but also to
promote domestic policies-such as national laws that regulate markets,
technology, and intermediaries-that ensure the conditions necessary
for the respect of expressive rights. For example, a state may need to
rely on competition law to regulate markets in a way that ensures
sufficient avenues for expression. In the context of DVD region coding,
it may need to ensure its laws do not enable corporate actors to
substantially burden expressive rights by imposing technological
barriers to the flow of information across borders. In other words, the
obligations of states to regulate private actors is a continuing one-an
ex-ante obligation to prevent in addition to an ex-post obligation to
remedy. International law tempers the state action problem by requiring
states to take proactive measures to create the structural conditions
necessary to prevent violations from happening in addition to taking
responsibility once a violation has occurred.
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
32 See REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE
FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 126-27 (2012).
33 ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1); see also General Comment No. 21, supra note 3, T 48 (states
are obligated to "respect; . . . protect; and . . . fulfil" the right to participate in cultural life).
34 United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 (The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant), 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004); see also United Nations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Para.
I of the Covenant), T 7, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
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This more robust understanding of state obligations with respect to
private conduct that burdens expressive rights leads me to my last point
about Professor Yu's timely and engaging article. In the final section of
his article, Professor Yu calls for a "human rights-based right to
circumvent."35 Although there may be reasons to be cautious about
recognizing a "human right to circumvent"-concerns about unduly
expanding rightS36 or about embedding particular choices about means
in law 37-Professor Yu's call for a "human rights-based right to
circumvent" could be extremely powerful both as an example of a
domestic policy designed to ensure a right of access and as a framing
device. A state might create such a right to circumvent in furtherance of
its obligation to organize domestic policy in a way that ensures
individuals have access to the cultural and expressive material necessary
for the fulfillment of their human rights. In this way, copyright law can
be viewed as not only a barrier but also a solution. Because region
codes risk impermissibly burdening individual human rights, the state
has an obligation to alter its law to allow people to act to protect their
own rights. In addition, a human rights-based right to circumvent could
be an extremely compelling framing device-a way of organizing
around opposition to technological measures that pose risks for human
rights.
Access rights are more important than ever before. Access to
information, culture and expression allows us to define our identities,
hold our governments accountable, protect our health, educate our
children, and transform our world. DVD region coding provides a
paradigmatic case for examining the problem of limits on access within
a human rights framework. At what point do de facto burdens on rights
by corporate actors pursuing private interests constitute a violation that
can and should be regulated by the state? Defining this line is no trivial
matter. Much of the regulation of our "digital lives" today is carried out
by private actors largely not accountable to those affected by their
decisions. 38 Understanding the obligations of states with respect to this
conduct is an important step toward reintroducing transparency and
accountability into the regulation of expression and culture.
35 Yu, supra note 2, at 244.
36 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984).
37 See, e.g., Vinton G. Cerf, Internet Access Is Not a Human Right, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at
A25.
38 See MACKINNON, supra note 32, at xx-xxi.
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